Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have a wide range of applications, and software employing them must be thoroughly tested, especially in safety critical domains. However, traditional software testing methodology, including test coverage criteria and test case generation algorithms, cannot be applied directly to DNNs. This paper bridges this gap. First, inspired by the traditional MC/DC coverage criterion, we propose a set of four test criteria that are tailored to the distinct features of DNNs. Our novel criteria are incomparable and complement each other. Second, for each criterion, we give an algorithm for generating test cases based on linear programming (LP). The algorithms produce a new test case (i.e., an input to the DNN) by perturbing a given one. They encode the test requirement and a fragment of the DNN by fixing the activation pattern obtained from the given input example, and then minimize the difference between the new and the current inputs. Finally, we validate our method on a set of networks trained on the MNIST dataset. The utility of our method is shown experimentally with four objectives: (1) bug finding; (2) DNN safety statistics; (3) testing efficiency and (4) DNN internal structure analysis.
Introduction
Artificial intelligence, and specifically algorithms that implement deep neural networks (DNNs), can deliver human-level results in some specialist tasks such as full-information two-player games [1] , image classification [2] and some areas of natural language processing [3] . There is now a prospect of a wide-scale deployment of DNNs, including in safety-critical applications such as self-driving cars. This naturally raises the question how software implementing this technology would be tested, validated and ultimately certified to meet the requirements of the relevant safety standards.
The software industry relies on testing as primary means to provide stakeholders with information about the quality of the software product or service under test [4] . Research in software engineering has resulted in a broad range of approaches to test software ( [5, 6, 7] give comprehensive reviews). In white-box testing, the structure of a program is exploited to (perhaps automatically) generate test cases according to test requirements. Code coverage criteria (or metrics) have been designed to guide the generation of test cases, and evaluate the completeness of a test suite. E.g., a test suite with 100% statement coverage exercises all instructions at least once. While it is arguable whether this ensures correct functionality, high coverage is able to increase users' confidence (or trust) in the program [5] . Structural coverage metrics are used as a means of assessment in a number of high-tier safety standards.
Artificial intelligence systems are typically implemented in software. This includes AI that uses DNNs, either as a monolithic end-to-end system [8] or as a system component. However, (white-box) testing for traditional software cannot be directly applied to DNNs, because the software that implements DNNs does not have suitable structure. In particular, DNNs do not have traditional flow of control and thus it is not obvious how to define criteria such as branch coverage for them.
In this paper, we bridge this gap by proposing a novel (white-box) testing methodology for DNNs, including both test coverage criteria and test case generation algorithms. Technically, DNNs contain not only an architecture, which bear some similarity with traditional software programs, but also a large set of parameters, which are calculated by the training procedure. Any approach to testing DNNs needs to consider the distinct features of DNNs, such as the syntactic connections between neurons in adjacent layers (neurons in a given layer interact with each other and then pass information to higher layers), the ReLU activation functions, and the semantic relationship between layers (e.g., neurons in deeper layers represent more complex features [9, 10] ).
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, we propose four test criteria, inspired by the MC/DC test criteria [11] from traditional software testing, that fit the distinct features of DNNs mentioned above. MC/DC was developed by NASA and has been widely adopted. It is used in avionics software development guidance to ensure adequate testing of applications with the highest criticality. There exist two coverage criteria for DNNs: neuron coverage [12] and safety coverage [13] , both of which have been proposed recently. Our experiments show that neuron coverage is too coarse: 100% coverage can be achieved by a simple test suite comprised of few input vectors from the training dataset. On the other hand, safety coverage is black-box, too fine, and it is computationally too expensive to compute a test suite in reasonable time. Moreover, our four proposed criteria are incomparable with each other, and complement each other in guiding the generation of test cases.
Second, we develop an automatic test case generation algorithm for each of our criteria. The algorithms produce a new test case (i.e., an input vector) by perturbing a given one using linear programming (LP). They encode the test requirement and a fragment of the DNN by fixing the activation pattern obtained from the given input vector, and then optimize over an objective that is to minimize the difference between the new and the current input vector. LP can be solved efficiently in practice, and thus, our test case generation algorithms can generate a test suite with low computational cost.
Finally, we implement our testing approaches in a software tool named DeepCover 3 , and validate it by conducting experiments on a set of DNNs obtained by training on the MNIST dataset. We observe that (1) the generated test suites are effective in detecting safety bugs (i.e., adversarial examples) of the DNNs; (2) our approach can provide metrics, including coverage, adversarial ratio and adversarial quality, to quantify the safety/robustness of a DNN and are shown to be efficient; (3) the testing is efficient enough and (4) internal behaviors of DNNs have been also investigated through the experiments. Overall, the method is able to handle networks of non-trivial size (>10,000 hidden neurons). This compares very favourably with current approaches based on SMT, MILP and SAT, which can only handle networks with a few hundred hidden neurons.
Preliminaries: Deep Neural Networks
A (feedforward and deep) neural network, or DNN, is a tuple N = (L, T, Φ), where each of its elements is defined as follows.
-L = {L k |k ∈ {1, . . . , K}} is a set of layers such that L 1 is the input layer, L K is the output layer, and layers other than input and output layers are called hidden layers.
• Each layer L k consists of s k nodes, which are also called neurons.
• The l-th neuron of layer k is denoted by n k,l . -T ⊆ L × L is a set of connections between layers such that, except for the input and output layers, each layer has an incoming connection and an outgoing connection.
for each non-input layer.
• We use v k,l to denote the value of n k,l .
• Except for inputs, every node is connected to nodes in the preceding layer by pre-defined weights such that for all k and l with 2 ≤ k ≤ K and
where w k−1,h,l is the pre-trained weight for the connection between n k−1,h (i.e., the h-th node of layer k − 1) and n k,l (i.e., the l-th node of layer k) and δ k,l the the so-called bias for node n k,l . We note that this definition can express both fully-connected functions and convolutional functions.
• Values of neurons in hidden layers need to pass through a Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) [14] , where the final activation value of each neuron of hidden layers is defined as
ReLU is by far the most popular and effective activation function for neural networks.
• Finally, for any input, the neural network assigns a label, that is, the index of the node of output layer with the largest value:
Let L be the set of labels.
Example 1. Figure 1 is a simple neural network with four layers. Its input space is D L1 = R 2 where R the set of real numbers.
Owing to the use of the ReLU as in (2) , the behavior of a neural network is highly non-linear. Given a neuron n k,l , its ReLU is said to be activated iff its value v k,l is strictly positive; otherwise, when ReLU (v k,l ) = 0, the ReLU is deactivated. Neural network instance Given one particular input x, we say that the neural work N is instantiated and we use N [x] to denote this instance of the network.
-Given a network instance N [x], the activation value of each node n k,l of the network and the final classification label are fixed and they are denoted as
respectively. -When the input of a neural network is given, the activation or deactivation of each ReLU operator in the network is also determined. We write u k,l [x] for the value before applying the ReLU and v k,l [x] for the value after applying the ReLU. Moreover, we write
When there is no ReLU operator for a neuron, sign simply returns the sign (positive or negative) of its activation value. Example 2. Let N be a network whose architecture is given in Figure 1 . Assume that the weights for the first three layers are as follows
and that all biases are 0. When given an input
3 Adequacy Criteria for Testing Deep Neural Networks
Test Coverage and MC/DC
Let N be a set of neural networks, R the set of requirements, and T the set of test suites.
Definition 1 ([5]).
A test adequacy criterion, or a test coverage metric, is a function
Intuitively, M (N , R, T ) quantifies the degree of adequacy to which a network N is tested by a test suite T with respect to a requirement R. Usually, the greater the number M (N , R, T ), the more adequate the testing. Throughout this paper, we may use criterion and metric interchangeably. In this section, we will develop a set of test requirements R and their corresponding criteria M R. The generation of test suite T R from the requirement R will be discussed in the next section.
Our new criteria for DNNs are inspired by established practices in software testing, in particular MC/DC test coverage, but are designed for the specific features of neural networks. Modified Condition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC) [11] is a method of ensuring adequate testing for safety-critical software. At its core is the idea that if a choice can be made, all the possible factors (conditions) that contribute to that choice (decision) must be tested. For traditional software, both conditions and the decision are usually Boolean variables or Boolean expressions. For example, the decision
contains the three conditions (a > 3), (b = 0) and (c = 4). The following six test cases provide 100% MC/DC coverage:
The first two test cases already satisfy both the condition coverage (i.e., all possibilities of the conditions are exploited) and the decision coverage (i.e., all possibilities of the decision d are exploited). The last four cases are needed because for MC/DC each condition should evaluate to true and false at least once and should also affect the decision outcome.
Decisions and Conditions in DNNs
Our instantiation of the concepts "decision" and "condition" for DNNs is inspired by the similarity between Equation (1) and Equation (5) and the distinct features of DNNs. For example, it has been claimed that neurons in a deeper layer represent more complex features [9, 10] . Therefore, the information represented by a neuron in the next layer can be seen as a summary (implemented by the layer function, the weights, and the bias) of the information in the current layer. The core idea of our criteria is to ensure that not only the presence of a feature needs to be tested but also the effects of less complex features on a more complex feature must be tested. More specifically, we consider every neuron n k,l for 2 ≤ k ≤ K and 1 ≤ l ≤ s k a decision and say that its conditions are those neurons in the layer k − 1, i.e.,
Definition 2. A neuron pair (n k,i , n k+1,j ) are two neurons in adjacent layers k and
Given a network N , we write O(N ) for the set of its neuron pairs.
Our new criteria are obtained by giving different ways of instantiating the changes of the conditions and the decision. Unlike Boolean variables or expressions, where it is trivial to define change, i.e., true → false or false → true, for neurons, there are many different ways of defining that a decision is affected by the changes of the conditions. Before giving definitions for "affected" in Section 3.3, we clarify when a neuron "changes".
First, the change observed on a neuron activation value v k,l can be either a sign change or a value change.
Definition 3 (Sign Change). Given a neuron n k,l and two test cases x 1 and x 2 , we say that the sign change of n k,l is exploited by x 1 and x 2 , denoted as sc(n k,l ,
. We write ¬sc(n k,l , x 1 , x 2 ) when the condition is not satisfied.
Definition 4 (Value Change). Given a neuron n k,l and two test cases x 1 and x 2 , we say that the value change of n k,l is exploited with respect to a value function g by x 1 and
Moreover, we write ¬vc(g, n k,l , x 1 , x 2 ) when the condition is not satisfied.
The function g represents the change between two values
Second, for the set of neurons in a layer k, we can quantify the degree of their changes in terms of distance.
Definition 5 (Distance Change). Given the set of neurons
layer k and two test cases x 1 and x 2 , we say that the distance change of P k is exploited with respect to a distance function h by x 1 and x 2 , denoted as dc(h, k,
We write ¬dc(h, k, x 1 , x 2 ) when any of the conditions is not satisfied.
Covering Methods
In this section, we present four covering methods for a given neuron pair and two test cases.
Definition 6 (Sign-Sign Cover, or SS Cover). A neuron pair α = (n k,i , n k+1,j ) is SScovered by two test cases x 1 , x 2 , denoted as cov SS (α, x 1 , x 2 ), if the following conditions are satisfied by the network instances
The SS Cover is designed to provide evidence that the change of a condition neuron n k,l 's activation sign independently affects the sign of the decision neuron n k+1,j in the next layer. Intuitively, the first condition says that the sign change of neuron n k,i is exploited in x 1 and x 2 . The second says that, except for n k,i , at the k-th layer, the signs of all neurons do not change in x 1 and x 2 , and the third says that the sign change of neuron n k+1,j is exploited in x 1 and x 2 .
Example 3. (Continuation of Example 2) Given two inputs x 1 = (0.1, 0) and x 2 = (0, −1), we can compute the activation values for each neuron as given in Table 1 . Therefore, we have sc(n 2,1 , x 1 , x 2 ), ¬sc(n 2,2 , x 1 , x 2 ), ¬sc(n 2,3 , x 1 , x 2 ), and sc(n 3,1 , x 1 , x 2 ). By Definition 6, the neuron pair (n 2,1 , n 3,1 ) is SS-covered by x 1 and x 2 .
¬sc ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc sc ¬sc Table 1 : Activation values and sign changes for the input examples in Examples 3, 4, 5, 6. An entry can be of the form v, in which v ≥ 0 and ReLU is not activated, or v 1 (v 2 ), in which v 1 < 0, v 2 = 0, and the ReLU is activated, or sc, denoting that the sign has been changed, or ¬sc, denoting that there is no sign change.
The SS Cover is very close to MC/DC: instead of observing the change of a Boolean variable (i.e., true → false or false → true), we observe a sign change of a neuron. However, the behavior of a neural network has additional complexity. A direct adoption of the MC/DC-style coverage to a neural network does not necessarily catch all the important information in the network. The following three additional coverage criteria are designed to complement SS Cover.
First, the sign of v k+1,j can be altered between two test cases, even when none of the neuron values v k,i in layer k changes its sign.
Definition 7 (Distance-Sign Cover, or DS Cover). Given a distance function h, a neuron pair α = (n k,i , n k+1,j ) is DS-covered by two test cases x 1 , x 2 , denoted as cov h DS (α, x 1 , x 2 ), if the following conditions are satisfied by the network instances
-dc(h, k, x 1 , x 2 ), and -sc(n k+1,j , x 1 , x 2 ).
Intuitively, the first condition describes the distance change of neurons in layer k and the second condition requests the sign change of the neuron n k+1,j . Note that, in dc(h, k, x 1 , x 2 ), according to Definition 5, we have another condition
. This is to ensure that the change in layer k is small (and therefore x 1 and x 2 have the same label): there might exist a completely different test case x 2 for x 1 in which sc(n k+1,j , x 1 , x 2 ) is satisfied, but such a pair of test cases is not meaningful for testing purpose. Note that, for two pairs (n k,i , n k+1,j ) and (n k,i , n k+1,j ) with the same second component n k+1,j , the coverage of any of them implies the coverage of the other one. Table 1 , we have sc(n 3,3 , x 1 , x 2 ) and all neurons in layer 2 do not change their activation signs, i.e., ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 3} : ¬sc(n 2,i , x 1 , x 2 ). Thus, by Definition 7, x 1 and x 2 (subject to a certain distance metric h) can be used to DS-cover the neuron pairs (n 2,i , n 3,3 ) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , 3}.
Until now, we have seen the sign change of a decision neuron n k+1,j as the equivalent of a change of a decision in MC/DC. This view may still be limited. For DNNs, a key safety problem [16] related to their high non-linearity is that an insignificant (or imperceptible) change to the input (e.g., an image) may lead to a significant change to the output (e.g., its label). We expect our criteria can provide guidance to the test case generation algorithms for discovering un-safe cases, by working with two adjacent layers, which are finer than the input-output relation. We notice that the label change in the output layer is the direct result of the changes to the activation values in the penultimate layer. Therefore, in addition to the sign change, the change of the value of the decision neuron n k+1,j is also significant. Definition 8 (Sign-Value Cover, or SV Cover). Given a value function g, a neuron pair α = (n k,i , n k+1,j ) is SV-covered by two test cases x 1 , x 2 , denoted as cov 
The first and second conditions are the same as those in Definition 6. The difference is in the third condition, in which instead of considering the sign change sc(n k+1,j , x 1 , x 2 ), we consider the value change vc(g, n k+1,j , x 1 , x 2 ) with respect to a value function g. Intuitively, the SV Cover observes significant change of a decision neuron's value, by independently modifying one its condition neuron's sign.
Example 5. (Continuation of Example 2) Consider the neuron pair (n 2,1 , n 3,2 ), given two inputs x 1 = (0, −1) and x 2 = (0.1, −0.1), by the computed activation values in Table 1 , we have sc(n 2,1 , x 1 , x 2 ), ¬sc(n 2,2 , x 1 , x 2 ), and ¬sc(n 2,3 , x 1 , x 2 ). If, according to the function g,
Similarly, we have the following definition by replacing the sign change of the decision in Definition 7 with the value change.
Definition 9 (Distance-Value Cover, or DV Cover). Given a distance function h and a value function g, a neuron pair α = (n k,i , n k+1,j ) is DV-covered by two test cases 
Similar to DS cover, the DV cover of a pair (n k,i , n k+1,j ) implies the DV cover of any other pair (n k,i , n k+1,j ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , s k } and i = i. Intuitively, a DV cover targets the scenario that there is no sign change for a neuron pair, but the decision neuron's value is changed significantly. v3,2[x2] ≈ 2.96, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 3} : ¬sc(n 2,i , x 1 , x 2 ), and ¬sc(n 3,3 , x 1 , x 2 ).
Test Requirements and Criteria
We now give the requirements and criteria in Definition 1 by utilizing the covering methods defined in Section 3.3. Let F = {cov SS , cov Definition 10 (Test Requirement). Given a network N and a covering method f ∈ F , a test requirement Rf is to find a test suite T Rf such that it covers all neuron pairs in O(N ) with respect to f , i.e.,
Due to the one-to-one correspondence between f and T Rf , we may write T Rf as T f .
Intuitively, a test requirement Rf asks that all neuron pairs α are covered by at least two test cases in T f with respect to the covering method f . When the requirement cannot be satisfied completely by a given test suite T , we might want to compute the degree to which this requirement is satisfied.
Definition 11 (Test Criterion). Given a network N and a covering method f ∈ F , the test criterion M Rf for a test suite T is as follows:
Due to the one-to-one correspondence between M Rf (N , Rf, T ) and f , we may write
Intuitively, it computes the percentage of the neuron pairs that are covered by test cases in T with respect to the covering method f . Table 2 : A set of adequacy criteria for testing the DNNs, inspired by the MC/DC code coverage criteria. The columns are changes to the conditions (i.e., the activations of neurons in layer k), and the rows are changes to the decision (i.e., the activation of a neuron in layer k + 1)
Finally, instantiating f with covering methods in F , we obtain four test crite- Table 2 summaries the criteria with respect to their key ingredients, i.e., changes to the conditions and the decision.
Automated Test Case Generation
We introduce for each test requirement Rf for f ∈ F an automatic test case generation algorithm Test-Gen(N , Rf ) to compute T f . As we will explain later in Section 5.2, the generation of test suites for the criteria is non-trivial: a random testing approach will not achieve a test suite with high adequacy. In this paper, we consider approaches based on constraint solving. The algorithms are based on Linear Programming (LP). We remark that, as usual in conventional software testing, our test requirements/criteria are broader than any particular test case generation algorithm, and there may exist alternative algorithms for a given requirement/criterion. Table 1, we 
The functionf represented by a DNN is highly non-linear and cannot be encoded with linear programming (LP) in general. Therefore, other constraint solvers such as SMT [17, 18, 19] , MILP [20, 21, 19, 22] , SAT [23] 
In the following, we explain the LP encoding of a DNN instance N [x] (Section 4.1), introduce a few operations on the given activation pattern (Section 4.2), discuss a safety requirement (Section 4.3), and then present the algorithms based on them (Section 4.4).
LP Model of a DNN Instance
The variables used in the LP model are distinguished in bold. All variables are realvalued. Given an input x, the input variable x, whose value is to be synthesized with LP, is required to have the identical activation pattern as x, i.e., ap
We use u k,i and v k,i to denote the valuations of a neuron n k,i before and after the application of ReLU, respectively. Then, we have the following set
Moreover, the activation valuation u k,i of each neuron is decided by the activation values v k−1,j of those neurons in the prior layer. Therefore, we add the following set
Please note that the resulting LP model
represents a symbolic set of inputs that have the identical activation pattern as x. Further, we can specify some optimization objective obj, and call an LP solver to find the optimal x (if one exists).
Operations on activation patterns
We define a few operations on the set C[x] of constraints. First, Definition 13. Let C[1 . . . k ] be a partial encoding of C up to layer k . More precisely, we write C[1 . . . k ] if we substitute K in Expression (8) and (9) by k .
Note that, for each neuron n k,i , in Expression 8, we have either u k,i ≥ 0 ∧ v k,i = u k,i or u k,i < 0 ∧ v k,i = 0, but not both. We write C 1 [x](k, i) to denote the expression that is taken, and write C 1 [x](k, i) −1 to denote the other expression that is not taken. C[(k, i) ] be the same set of constraints as C, except that the constraint
Definition 14. Let
Assume that the value function g and the distance function h are linearly encodable. Without loss of generality, we still use g and h to denote their linear encodings, respectively. 
Furthermore, we can generalize the above notation and define C[ops] for ops being a set of operations. It is obvious that the ordering of the operations does not matter if there does not exist a neuron whose value is affected by more than one operations in ops.
Safety Requirement
In this section, we discuss a safety requirement that is independent of the test criteria. This is to check automatically whether a given test case x is a bug. The neural network N represents a functionf (x), which approximates f (x) : D L1 → L, a function that models the human perception capability in labeling input examples. Therefore, a straightforward safety requirement is to require that for all test cases x ∈ D L1 , we havef (x) = f (x). However, a direct use of such requirement is not practical because the number of inputs in D L1 can be too large, if not infinite, to be labeled by human.
A pragmatic way, as done in many other works including [16, 17] , is to study the following safety requirement.
Definition 16 (Safety Requirement).
Given a finite set X of correctly labeled inputs, the safety requirement is to ensure that for all inputs x that are close to an input x ∈ X, we havef (x ) = f (x).
Ideally, the closeness between two inputs x and x is to be measured with respect to the human perception capability. In practice, this has been approximated by various approaches, including norm-based distance measures. In this paper, the closeness of two inputs x 1 and x 2 is concretised as the norm L ∞ , i.e., ||x 1 − x 2 || ∞ ≤ b for some bound b ∈ R. Specifically, we define the predicate
We remark that our algorithms can work with any definition of closeness as long as it can be encoded as a set of linear constraints. The test generation algorithms in this paper enable the computation of x 1 and x 2 such that ||x 1 − x 2 || ∞ can be upper bounded by a small number. A pair of inputs that satisfy the closeness definition are called adversarial examples if only one of them is correctly labeled by the DNN. In our experiments, to exhibit the behavior of adversarial examples, we instantiate b with a large enough number, and study the percentage of adversarial examples with respect to the number b (as illustrated in Figure 2 for one of the criteria).
Automatic Test Generation Algorithms
Our testing criteria defined in Section 3 feature that the (sign or value) change of every decision neuron must be supported by (sign or distance) changes of its condition neurons. Given a neuron pair and a testing criterion, we are going to find two activation patterns, and the two patterns together shall exhibit the changes required by the corresponding testing criterion. The inputs matching these patterns will be added to the final test suite. At first, we define a routine to call an LP solver, which takes as input a set C[x 1 ] of constraints and an optimization objective obj, and returns a valuation x 2 for input variable x if one exists. For instance, a solver call can be written as follows.
If returned successfully, x 2 satisfies the linear constraints of C[x 1 ], with respect to the optimization objective obj.
The test suite generation framework is given as in Algorithm 1: for every (n k,i , n k+1,j ) of O(N ), it calls the get input pair(f, n k,i , n k+1,j ) method to find an input pair that satisfies the test requirement, according to the covering method f ∈ {cov SS , cov
We remind that O(N ) is the set of neuron pairs of a DNN (see Definition 2).
Algorithm 1 Test-Gen
INPUT: DNN N , covering method f OUTPUT: test suite T , adversarial examples T 1: for each neuron pair n k,i , n k+1,j ∈ O(N ) do 2: x1, x2 = get input pair(f, n k,i , n k+1,j ) 3: if x1, x2 are valid inputs then 4:
T ← T ∪ {x1, x2} 5:
.label and close(x1, x2) then 6:
T ← T ∪ {x1, x2}
To get an input pair of tests for each corresponding neuron pair, we assume the existence of a data set of correctly labeled inputs. An input x 1 in data set serves for the reference activation pattern, by modifying which we obtain another activation pattern such that the two together shall be able to support testing conditions specified by the covering method for a neuron pair n k,i and n k+1,j .
Algorithm 2 tries to find a pair of inputs that satisfy requirements of SS Cover for a neuron pair, which specify that the sign change of n k,i must independently change also the sign of n k+1,j . In particular, the LP call in Algorithm 2 comes with the constraints that a new activation pattern must share the partial encoding of x 1 's activation pattern until layer k (by Definition 13), but with signs of neuron n k,i and n k+1,j 's activation being negated (by Definition 14) . As a matter of fact, this encoding is even stronger than the requirement in SS Cover, which does not specify constraints for neurons in prior to layer k. The encoding in the lp call is a compromise for efficiency, as it is computationally un-affordable to consider combinations of even a subset of neuron activations. Consequently, the LP call may fail because the proposed activation pattern is infeasible, and this explains why we need to prepare a data set for potentially multiple LP calls.
Algorithm 2 get input pair with the first argument being cov SS INPUT: cov SS , neuron pair n k,i , n k+1,j OUTPUT: input pair x1, x2
The functions that find input pairs subject to the other test requirements largely follow the same structure as the SS Cover case, with the addition of distance change or value change constraints. Note that when implementing test generation for cov 
In our implementation, every time the get input pair is called we randomly select 40 correctly labeled inputs to construct the data set. The objective min ||x 2 −x 1 || ∞ is used in all LP calls, to find good adversarial examples with respect to the safety requirement. Moreover, we use
with σ = 2 for cov g SV and σ = 5 for cov d,g DV . We admit that such choices are experimental. Meanwhile, for generality and to speed up the experiments, we leave the distance function Algorithm 4 get input pair with the first argument being cov g SV INPUT: cov g SV , neuron pair n k,i , n k+1,j OUTPUT: input pair x1, x2
if x2 is a valid input then return x1, x2 4: return , h unspecified. Providing a specific h may require more LP calls to find a x 2 (because h is an additional constraint) but the resulting x 2 can be better with respect to h. 
The rationale behind is that condition neurons do not equally affect their decision, and those with higher (absolute) weights are likely to have a larger influence.
Experiments
We use the well-known MNIST Handwritten Image Dataset to train a set of 10 fully connected DNNs to perform classification. Each DNN has an input layer of 28 × 28 = 784 neurons and an output layer of 10 neurons. The number of hidden layers for each DNN is randomly sampled from the set of {3, 4, 5} and at each hidden layer, the number of neurons are uniformly selected from 20 to 100. Every DNN is trained until an accuracy of at least 97.0% is reached on the MNIST validation data. Details on the structure of the DNNs are given in Table 3 .
All implementations and the data discussed in this section are available online 5 . Most experiments were conducted on a MacBook with 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB of memory.
Hypothesis 1: Neuron Coverage is Easy
Neuron coverage is a simple test coverage metric proposed in [12] . It was applied as one of the dual optimization objectives to compute adversarial examples for DNNs. Unfortunately, as a testing criterion, neuron coverage is inadequate. In particular, a test suite with high neuron coverage is not sufficient to increase confidence in the neural network in safety-critical domains.
To demonstrate this, for each DNN tested, we randomly pick 25 images from the MNIST test dataset. For each selected image, to maximize the neuron coverage, if an input neuron is not activated (i.e., its activation value is equal to 0), we sample its value from [0, 0.1]. Then we measure the neuron coverage of the DNN by using the generated test suite of 25 images. As a result, for all 10 DNNs, we obtain almost 100% neuron coverage. Our simple experiment here demonstrates that it is straight-forward to obtain a trivial test suite that has high neuron coverage but does not provide any adversarial examples.
As stated in [5] , the role of test adequacy is a contributory factor in building confidence in the repeated cycle of testing, debugging, modifying program, and then testing again. The above experimental result shows that neuron coverage does not serve well in this role.
Hypothesis 2: Random Testing is Inefficient
Previous research [5] has observed that, while easy to perform, random testing does not yield high confidence in software reliability, or more formally, test adequacy is typically low. Our experiments confirm this for the specific case of DNNs.
For each DNN, we first choose an image from the MNIST test dataset, denoted by x. Subsequently, we randomly sample 10 5 inputs in the region bounded by x ± 0.1, and we check whether an adversarial example exists for the original image x. Using this process, we have obtained adversarial examples for only a single one of the 10 DNNs; for the other nine DNNs, we did not observe any adversarial examples among the 10 5 randomly generated images.
More importantly, random testing does not provide information on the adequacy level achieved. Though it can be used to generate test cases for simple criteria such as neuron coverage, it is not trivial to apply random testing for complex metrics, such as the ones given in this paper, which require independent sign change or value change of particular neuron combinations. 6 
SS, SV, DS, and DV Cover
We apply the test generation algorithms given in Section 4, and we record the testing results for the SS, SV, DS, and DV covering methods. Besides the coverage M f for each method, we also measure the percentage of adversarial examples among all test pairs in the test suite, which is denoted as AEf with f ∈ {cov SS , cov
We further investigate the use of the "top 10 weights" simplification of SS Cover, results of which are represented by M cov w10 SS and AEcov w10 SS . For clarity, our experiments are classified into four classes: bug finding DNN safety statistics testing efficiency DNN internal structure analysis, and results will be labeled correspondingly.
DNN Bug finding
The full results from our testing approaches are reported in Table 3 .
In our set-up, the input layer may contribute a disproportionately large number of covered neuron pairs. Thus, in Table 3 , we separate them from condition neurons in the input layer. As we are going to see later, coverage of neuron pairs at front layers is easier than covering their deeper counterparts.
hidden layers M covSS AEcovSS M cov Table 3 : Results on 10 DNNs with the SS, DS, SV and SV covering methods
The results in Table 3 are promising.
-Our test generation algorithms are effective, as they reach high coverage for all covering criteria. -The covering methods designed are useful. This is supported by the fact that a significant portion of adversarial examples have been identified. Table 4 : Test suites generated for DNNs using different criteria adversarial examples, we can plot a distance curve to see how close the adversarial example is to the correct input. Let us take a further look at the results of SS Cover for the last three DNNs in Table 3 . As illustrated in Figure 2 , the horizontal axis measures the L ∞ distance, and the vertical axis reports the accumulated percentage of adversarial examples fall into this distance. A more robust DNN will have its shape in the small distance end (towards 0) lower, as the reported adversarial examples are relatively farther from their original correct inputs. Intuitively, this means that more effort needs to be made in order to fool a DNN from correct classification to a wrong output label. Table 4 , which lists the number of neurons and neuron pairs in a DNN, and the number of test pairs inside the test suite under different criteria. As expected, covering methods that request independent sign change of condition neurons need to examine a much larger set of test cases. Figure 4 shows the difference, on coverage and adversarial percentage, between SS Cover and its simplification for the testing of 10 DNNs. In general, the two are comparable. This is very useful in practice, as the "top weights" simplification mitigates the size of test suite resulted, and it is thus able to behave as a faster pre-processing phase and even alternative with comparable results for SS Cover. Layerwise behavior Through our experiments, we believe it is also worth showing that different layers of a DNN exhibit different behaviors in testing. Figure 5 reports the SS Cover results, collected in adjacent layers. In particular, Figure 5a gives the percentage of covered neuron pairs within individual adjacent layers. As we can see, when going deeper into the DNN, it can become harder for the cover of neuron pairs. Under such circumstances, to improve the coverage performance, the use of larger data set when generating test pairs is needed. Figure 5b gives the percentage of adversarial examples found at different layers. Interestingly, it seems that most adversarial examples be found around the middle layers of all DNNs tested. Table 5 confirm that the LP model of a partial activation pattern is indeed lightweight, and its complexity increases in the linear manner as traversing into deeper layers of a DNN.
DNN safety analysis

Convolutional Neural Networks
The testing approach in this paper can be generalized to Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). In a CNN, a convolutional layer consists of multiple feature maps. The weights and bias that define a feature map are often said to be filters. Given a decision neuron inside some feature map, its activation is computed by a subset of precedent neurons that are processed by the associated filter. To investigate the testing of CNNs, we trained two networks N and transition coverage [24, 25] . In the following, we briefly review existing work on how to validate safety properties of DNNs.
Existing Test Coverage Metrics Up to now, there are two proposals for test coverage criteria. In [12] , neuron coverage is proposed, and it is applied in [26] to guide the testing of DNN-driven autonomous cars. Given an input x, we can observe the activations of the hidden neurons and compute the set ReLU (x) of hidden neurons whose ReLU activation function is activated. Let P H be the set of hidden neurons. Given a test suite T , its neuron coverage is
Cov neuron (X) = | {ReLU (x) | x ∈ T }|/|P H |
While neuron coverage bears some similarity with statement coverage, as we explained in the paper, it is a very coarse criterion: it is easy to find a test suite that achieves 100% neuron coverage but the network still allows trivial adversarial examples. Thus, neuron coverage does not even satisfy the expectations we usually have for a test suite with high statement coverage for conventional software [12] . In [13] , the input space is discretised with τ -hyper-rectangles, and then one test case is generated for each hyper-rectangle. It is shown that, if τ is small enough (precisely τ < 2 / for the minimum confidence gap and the Lipschitz constant of the network), then this testing approach can provide a guarantee, i.e., it can find all adversarial examples, and is able to claim safety when no adversarial example can be found. Thus, safety coverage is a strong criterion, but the generation of a test suite can be very expensive; therefore, [13] uses a Monte-Carlo Tree Search based approach to generate test cases. Assume that we have a test suite T and for each x ∈ T it is associated with a hyper-rectangle η x , then we have the safety coverage defined as follows:
Cov saf ety (X) = || {η x | x ∈ T }||/||η|| (14) where ||η|| measures the size of the region η.
Adversarial Example Generation of DNNs Most existing work, e.g., [16, 27, 28, 29, 30] , applies various heuristic algorithms, generally using search algorithms based on gradient descent or evolutionary techniques. [31] construct a saliency map of the importance of the pixels based on gradient descent and then modify the pixels. These approaches may be able to find adversarial examples efficiently, but are not able to provide any guarantee (like verification) or any certain level of confidence (like testing) about the nonexistence of adversarial examples when the algorithm fails to find one.
Automated Verification of DNNs There are two ways to perform safety verification for DNNs. The first is to reduce the problem into a constraint solving problem. Notable work includes, e.g., [32, 18] . Moreover, [20] determines whether an output value of a DNN is reachable from a given input subspace, and reduce the problem to a MILP problem. [33] considers the range of output values from a given input subspace. Their approach interleaves local search (based on gradient descent) with global search (based on reduction to MILP). These approaches can only work with small networks with a few hundred hidden neurons.
The second approach is to discretise the vector spaces of the input or hidden layers and then to apply exhaustive search algorithms or Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm on the discretised spaces. The guarantees are achieved by establishing local assumptions such as minimality of manipulations in [17] and minimum confidence gap for Lipschitz networks in [13] . This approach has been shown to be applicable to state-of-the-art networks.
Conclusions
We have proposed a set of novel test criteria for DNNs, developped for each criterion an algorithm for test suite generation, and implemented the algorithms in a software tool. Our experiments on a set of DNNs trained on the MNIST data set show promising results, indicating the effectiveness of both the test criteria and the test case generation algorithms for testing the DNNs. Future work includes even more efficient test case generation algorithms that do not require linear programming.
